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The European Union (EU) cyber sanctions framework 
offers a new foreign policy tool that came into effect in 
May 2019. It consists of two legal acts: Council 
Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 and Council Regulation 
2019/796 providing for targeted restrictive measures 
against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its 
Member States. These measures include travel bans, 
asset freezes and prohibition to make funds and 
economic resources available to those responsible for 
cyber-attacks. The EU cyber sanctions framework is not 
country-specific but global in scope. Its main feature is 
indeed the shift to individual listings – the inclusion of 
natural or legal persons on sanctions lists – decoupled 
from a specific geographic area. This contrasts with most 
of the EU sanctions packages that are taken in response 
to major political crises in third countries (e.g. Belarus, 
Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela).  
 
In trying to take a more assertive position on cyberspace 
matters, the EU has to date aligned itself to a large extent 
with the US cyber-related sanctions programme. For 
instance, in July 2020 the EU introduced targeted 
sanctions against Russian, Chinese and North Korean 
entities and individuals that were already on the US cyber 
sanctions listings. While the US cyber sanctions 
programme is more advanced and benefits from less 
fragmented decision-making, EU decision-making on 
sanctions still requires unanimity, even though a shift 
towards a qualified majority voting is contemplated.  
 
Both in the US and in the EU, blacklisted cyber criminals 
are subject to a travel ban and their financial assets are 
frozen. Yet, in contrast to courts in the US, the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) applies a more stringent standard 
of judicial review for sanctions listings. In the past, this 
caused the Council of the EU to lose a considerable 
amount of sanctions-related cases. The Kadi saga is one of 
the most significant examples of thorough control by the 
EU judiciary over the respect for fundamental rights of 
Executive Summary 
> In the global cyber policy context, sanctions are 
important as they represent a central component of 
deterrence that actors like the European Union can 
employ in response to malicious cyber activities 
that threaten critical infrastructures, democratic 
institutions and processes. In the EU, the success of 
such cyber sanctions depends on the Council of the 
EU’s solid situational awareness and the access to 
comprehensive cyber intelligence information.   
> While the Council enjoys a considerable degree of 
discretion over sanctions designations, cyber 
sanctions are not immune to judicial review and 
must satisfy a set of procedural requirements. Most 
notably, they must include clear-cut and specific 
reasons for listing and be substantiated with 
comprehensive evidence. 
> Most of the EU sanctions listings are supported by 
evidence presented by the Member States. In the 
past, the Council lost several sanctions-related 
cases due to the Member States’ unwillingness to 
disclose confidential information in court for 
considerations of national security.  
> To allow the Council to access comprehensive 
intelligence information and to decrease its 
dependency on the voluntary decision of Member 
States to disclose intelligence, the EU needs its own 
fully-fledged intelligence service. This can be 
achieved, inter alia, via the enhancement of the 
Intelligence Centre’s (INTCEN) central role in 
supporting EU foreign policy decision-making in the 
area of (cyber)security, but also in foreign policy 
more widely (e.g. fight against terrorism, human 
rights abuses worldwide).  
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listed individuals (C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P – 
European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:518). The Kadi judgements imply that the 
EU’s competent authorities must ascertain that any 
sanctioned individual is informed of the reasons for their 
listing and that the alleged reasons were well-founded and 
supported by evidence. If either the statement of reasons 
is insufficient or the evidence is lacking, the restrictive 
measures will be struck down by the Court. 
 
Against this backdrop, the EU’s current cyber sanctions 
framework comes across as too weak to hold up to 
extensive judicial review. The potential repeated 
annulments of restrictive measures on ‘due process’ 
grounds bear substantial reputational risks for the EU and 
may undermine the credibility, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the EU’s external policy choices. Thus, it is 
crucial for the EU to strike the right balance between 
foreign and (cyber)security policy objectives and the need 
to protect individuals from arbitrary sanctions 
designations.  
 
This policy brief argues that the Council must come up with 
a workable legal standard in order to reconcile cyber 
diplomacy objectives with ‘due process’ rights. In 
particular, the Council will need to address two main 
weaknesses of cyber designations: it has to (i) provide 
clear-cut and specific reasons for listing and (ii) 
substantiate those with comprehensive intelligence 
information. To enable this, the EU needs to overcome its 
dependency on Member States for intelligence 
information and establish its own fully-fledged intelligence 
service to support its decision-making in the area of 
(cyber)security, but also foreign policy more widely. After 
addressing these points, the policy brief concludes by 
discussing EU competences that could solidly serve as a 
legal foundation for establishing such a fully-fledged EU 
cyber intelligence service.  
 
The thematic nature of the EU cyber sanctions regime 
Out of thirty-seven sanctions regimes in place in the EU, 
only four are horizontal and thematic in nature. Apart 
from cyber sanctions, these are sanctions addressing the 
use of chemical weapons, the EU’s terrorist list, and the 
newly adopted Magnitsky-type Act against human rights 
abusers. The EU also contemplates thematic sanctions for 
spreading disinformation and undermining trust in 
democratic institutions. There are also some quasi-
thematic sanctions regimes that pursue a specific 
objective while being tied to a particular country, for 
instance measures against Iran’s nuclear programme. 
The targeted nature of cyber sanctions allows the EU to 
avoid the sensitive question of attribution of responsibility 
for cyber-attacks to a third country within the currently 
still underspecified international legal framework. EU 
targeted sanctions constitute personalised deterrence 
measures against perpetrators of malicious cyber 
activities. Examples include the 2015 hack of the German 
Federal Parliament and the disrupting ransomware cyber-
attacks known as 'WannaCry' and 'NotPetya', which 
paralyzed the work of corporations and government 
agencies in 2017. As individual designations circumvent 
the establishment of state responsibility, the EU has de 
facto never attributed a cyber-attack to a third country but 
has limited its actions to the expression of concerns and 
condemnations.  
The EU’s Member States, in turn, are free to take their 
sovereign political decisions and make their own 
determinations with respect to the attribution of cyber-
attacks to a third country (Council 2019). However, the 
delimitation between targeted measures and attribution 
of responsibility to a state remains rather superficial since 
a vast majority of cyber-attacks with high impact, such as 
the abovementioned ‘WannaCry’ and ‘NotPetya’, were 
widely understood to have been orchestrated at the 
request and with the support of the governments of, 
allegedly, North Korea and Russia.  
The thematic nature of cyber sanctions offers a higher 
degree of flexibility in contrast to country-specific 
measures. First of all, it allows to act faster by updating the 
existing sanctions listings instead of enacting a completely 
new legal framework each time a new sanction has to be 
imposed. Complex and lengthy procedures that are prone 
to Member State vetoes and which are typical for new 
country-specific designations are thus not required. 
Second, its personalised character better suits the present 
dynamics in the cyberspace in which states often rely on 
non-state actors, so-called ‘proxies’, to project their 
strategic interests.  
While sanctions in response to cyber-attacks constitute a 
novel personalised cyber deterrence tool, they are not 
immune to judicial review and must satisfy a set of 
procedural requirements. However, the EU’s recent cyber 
sanctions framework comes across as too weak to hold up 
to extensive judicial review. Its first procedural weakness 
is due to the vague formulation of reasons for listing, 
which increases the likelihood of arbitrary decision-
making. Its second procedural weakness results from the 
confidential nature of evidence supporting the listing. In 
the next sections, we will explore the main weaknesses of 
cyber sanctions in more detail and propose a way forward 
in order to overcome the identified deficiencies. 
Weakness 1: Vagueness of listing criteria 
There is a downside to the increased flexibility offered by 
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character of the reasons for listing individual perpetrators. 
Sanctions are foreseen in response to cyber-attacks with a 
significant effect which constitute an external threat to the 
EU or its Member States (Council 2019). The concepts of 
‘significant effect’ and ‘external threat’ are not well-
defined and pave the way for inconsistent assessments. 
Listing criteria still remain blurry despite the fact that the 
Council provided a few elements to evaluate an attack’s 
significance such as on ‘the scope, scale, impact or severity 
of disruption caused’ and ‘the number of natural or legal 
persons, entities or bodies’ affected by a cyber-attack 
(ibid.). This obscurity increases the likelihood of arbitrary 
decision-making.   
At the same time, the vagueness of the listing criteria 
might be a result of earlier judicial intervention in the 
Council’s decision-making on sanctions. In the past, the 
Council’s legal service could not substantiate the narrow 
reasons for sanctions designations with sufficient 
evidence. An example was the difficulty the Council 
experienced when attempting to prove a direct link 
between the Iranian company ‘Fulmen’, active in the 
electrical equipment sector, and the Iranian nuclear 
program (C-280/12 P, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudia, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:775). Precise and narrow listing criteria 
thus set a standard which was too demanding. As a 
consequence, the CJEU struck down several sanctions 
listings for the lack of supporting evidence (ibid.). The 
Council, in turn, expanded the listing criteria in order to 
make its designations more immune to judicial review and 
decrease the likelihood of sanctions annulment. The 
broader the listing criteria, the easier it is for the Council 
to comply with ‘due process’ requirements concerning 
reasons and evidence (Chachko 2018). 
At the same time, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box if 
it does not determine with sufficient detail when and 
against whom a cyber-sanctions mechanism can be 
triggered. The decision to subject a person or entity to 
targeted restrictive measures requires clear-cut 
designation criteria, tailored to each specific case (Art. 296 
TFEU; C-176/13 P, Council v Bank Mellat, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:96, § 76). Accurate, up-to-date and 
defendable statements of reasons are necessary for 
avoiding inconsistent policies that could be manipulated 
by different lobby groups. Thus, the EU has to strike the 
right balance between two incompatible objectives: on 
the one hand, the need for flexibility and elasticity of the 
legal framework; on the other hand the principle of legal 
certainty. According to the latter, listing criteria must be 
crafted with sufficient detail and clarity to avoid any 
arbitrary designations.  
Weakness 2: Evidentiary standard 
Clear reasons for listings are not the only requirement that 
the Council has to respect. There is also the need to 
provide sufficient evidence to back up those reasons in 
order to withstand scrutiny by the CJEU. The well-known 
judgment in Kadi II established the bases on which the 
Council would have to defend its listings (C-584/10 P, C-
593/10 P & C-595/10 P – European Commission and Others 
v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, § 130). In 
particular, the Council must comply with the requirement 
to provide a sufficiently solid factual basis. 
Correspondingly, at least one of the reasons for listing will 
have to be backed up substantially by evidence. 
Otherwise, sanctions can be struck down for non-
compliance with the ‘standard of proof’ requirement and 
the Court not being in a position to take a fully informed 
decision.  
In this context, two observations can be made with regard 
to cyber sanctions. First, the evidence-gathering process is 
cumbersome due to the intrinsic features of the 
cyberspace such as its decentralised nature and 
anonymity. Malicious actors apply different deception 
techniques to avoid leaving a discernible footprint. 
Moreover, the Council might have difficulties to present a 
solid technical proof confirming the presumed 
perpetrator’s link with the incident. In the absence of such 
evidence, the Union faces a dilemma as to whether to go 
with a listing of this individual or comply with heavy ‘due 
process’ requirements. 
Second, cybersecurity policies require some level of 
confidentiality since they rely on intelligence data. The 
Council Decision to impose sanctions depends on 
individual decisions by each Member State’s competent 
authorities and all-source intelligence that they possess. In 
order to preserve the confidentiality of these documents 
each Member State is entitled to apply the rule of 
originator control (ORCON). According to the ORCON rule, 
classified information cannot be disclosed to other parties, 
unless the originator agrees to declassify it (Eckes 2013). 
While confidential information is often shared within the 
Council, Member States showed reluctance in the past to 
disclose it in court due to considerations of confidentiality 
and international security (ibid.). This implies that the 
Council might not be able to share the collected evidence 
in court since the disclosure of classified data can 
compromise various intelligence sources and bears 
considerable security risks for Member States and the 
entire EU. As an illustration, France and the UK refused for 
reasons of national security to adduce evidence 
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Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council of the European 
Union, ECLI:EU:T:2008:550, § 71-72; C-280/12 P, 
Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudia, ECLI:EU:C:2013:775, § 
77). In such cases, the Council’s inability or unwillingness 
to provide evidence caused the annulment of sanctions 
since the Court was unable to review the cases on their 
merits.    
The lack of willingness of national authorities to share 
intelligence data with other Member States and the CJEU 
unveils the problems of trust in the confidential treatment 
of information that is crucial for national security interests. 
The problem of confidential information-sharing is 
exacerbated by the fact that the EU judiciary does not have 
a well-established procedural framework on how to deal 
with sensitive evidence.  
Against this backdrop, the relatively recent semi-closed 
and closed evidence procedures open up an alternative 
avenue for the Council to defend its sanctions listings 
when sensitive information cannot be disclosed to the 
General Court. Those procedural adaptations are a direct 
result of the 2015 revisions of the Rules of Procedure of 
the General Court, in which the Council’s Security 
Committee actively participated (Abazi and Eckes 2018). 
Under the new rules, it is up to the General Court to assess 
the confidentiality of presented information and decide on 
the procedure to follow (open evidence, semi-closed 
evidence or closed evidence procedures). While the semi-
closed evidence procedure requires a non-confidential 
summary to be shared with the applicant, the closed 
evidence procedure allows to proceed without any 
disclosure of information. 
Accordingly, the Council now possesses the legal means of 
defending sanctions without evidence disclosure. This is 
meant to help avoid situations in which it loses sanctions-
related cases in court due to national classification rules or 
a Member State’s failure to declassify relevant documents 
in time. However, the downside to the closed evidence 
procedure is its negative impact on the right of defence 
and effective judicial protection in the EU alongside the 
broader risks it might entail for the fundamental rights of 
listed individuals (ibid.). 
The way forward: enhancing the EU’s (cyber)intelligence 
capabilities  
A higher level of shared situational awareness across the 
EU would enhance the effectiveness of the EU cyber 
sanctions mechanism. Enhancing the EU’s cyber 
intelligence capabilities would contribute both to 
providing more precise listing criteria (e.g. the assessment 
of an attack’s significance, scope, and threat level etc.) as 
well as to the collection and management of supporting 
evidence. This, in turn, would strengthen the EU’s capacity 
to prevent, deter and respond to cyber threats. 
At this stage, the exchange of finished intelligence reports 
by states takes place within the Intelligence Centre 
(INTCEN), which is run by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). Even though INTCEN is often referred to as 
an EU intelligence body, it remains a purely analytical 
structure with a substantial part of its analysts seconded 
by Member States (Arcos and Palacios 2020). 
Furthermore, it does not have collection capabilities and 
mostly relies on open-source, diplomatic data and 
intelligence shared by national authorities. As a result, the 
EU remains dependent on Member States’ willingness to 
submit and declassify sensitive information necessary for 
foreign policy decision-making. The creation of a fully-
fledged EU intelligence structure would be an important 
step towards breaking down these silos in the area of 
security and foreign policy. 
This would be in line with the ‘need-to-share’ mind-set of 
the EU 2020 Cybersecurity Strategy, which calls for the 
establishment of an EU cyber intelligence working group 
within INTCEN in order to advance strategic intelligence 
cooperation on cyber threats and activities (European 
Commission 2020). The EU 2020 Cybersecurity Strategy 
also foresees the establishment of a Joint Cyber Unit as a 
platform for technical and operational cooperation 
between different EU structures, such as the Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRTs) network, the 
European Cybercrime Centre, and the European Union 
Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). 
The idea of creating a fully-fledged European intelligence 
service has already been floated by leaders including 
French President Macron. However, the German 
government is afraid that such a duplication of national 
intelligence services at the EU level will cause efficiency 
losses. The debate on the institutional framework of 
intelligence collection reflects the contentious issue of the 
division of competences enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU, 
known as the ‘national identity clause’. It requires the EU 
to respect some core areas of Member States’ national 
identities and essential state functions, including national 
security. In a similar vein, Article 72 TFEU establishes that 
EU action in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
cannot interfere with the exercise of Member States’ 
actions with regard to the safeguarding of internal 
security. National security and intelligence services lie at 
the heart of national sovereignty and, thus, belong to the 
area of Member States’ sole responsibility. Governments 
are reluctant to give the EU powers that could interfere 
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The present competences constellation therefore does 
not facilitate the development of the Union’s own 
intelligence capabilities. In practice, it is hard to draw a  
line between national, internal, external and European 
(cyber)security policies due to their intrinsically 
interconnected nature. This challenge is exacerbated in 
the case of cyber-attacks that usually have a cross-border 
impact on security, economy and societal well-being in 
general. In this context, the internal market legal basis 
(Article 114 TFEU) can be relied upon for building a more 
coherent EU approach towards cyber intelligence 
collection and management. In particular, it can serve for 
incentivizing Member States to share more information 
and for expanding the EU institutions’ powers in terms of 
cyber intelligence management. This would help to bridge 
the existing gap between external and internal dimensions 
of (cyber)security. 
Moreover, there is a recent tendency towards the 
(cyber)securitisation of the internal market legal basis. 
Cybersecurity is seen as one of the essential elements of 
the smooth functioning of the digital single market. As an 
illustration, the Directive on security of network and 
information systems, a central piece of the EU’s 
cybersecurity-related legal framework, finds its legal basis 
in internal market harmonisation provisions. Article 114 
TFEU was relied upon for establishing ENISA, which is 
responsible for the development and implementation of 
EU policy and law on network and information security. 
The functional nature of the internal market legal basis 
may therefore also serve as a solid legal foundation for 
enhancing the central role of INTCEN in supporting the 




Given their overall impact on the fundamental rights of 
listed individuals, targeted cyber sanctions are prone to 
undergo the scrutiny of the CJEU. The likelihood that they 
are – successfully – challenged on ‘due process’ grounds 
(reasons for listing and evidentiary standard) is high. The 
Council’s difficulties in providing and substantiating 
reasons for sanctions listings is exacerbated by the EU’s 
dependency on Member States’ intelligence capabilities. 
The latter have so far been reluctant to share their 
intelligence due to the lack of trust in the EU’s institutional 
framework and confidential treatment of information 
provided by their national security authorities. 
 
The lack of a fully-fledged EU intelligence service is often 
viewed as the main obstacle to a well-functioning and 
autonomous EU foreign and security policy. For the 
purposes of better decision-making and evidence 
collection, the EU should thus gradually enhance its own 
cyber intelligence capabilities and decrease its 
dependency on the voluntary decision of Member States 
to disclose intelligence. This can be achieved inter alia via 
the enhancement of INTCEN’s central role in supporting 
the EU’s foreign policy decision-making in the area of 
(cyber)security, but also foreign policy more widely (e.g. 
fight against terrorism, human rights abuses worldwide). 
To realize this objective, the functional nature of the 
internal market legal basis (Article 114 TFEU) may serve as 
the bridge that closes the gap between internal and 
external dimensions of (cyber)security and enhances the 
coherence in the EU’s approach towards intelligence 
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